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1. Introduction
Thomas Schelling recalls his “exciting and stimulating times” in the early 1950s White
House as a young staffer in the Executive Office of the President. “People worked long
hours,” he remembered in a recent communication to one of us, “and felt compensated by the
sense of accomplishment, and ... personal importance. Regularly a Friday afternoon meeting
would go on until 8 or 9, when the chairman would suggest resuming Saturday morning.
Nobody demurred. We all knew it was important, and we were important. ... What happened
when the President issued an order that anyone who worked on Saturday was to receive
overtime pay…? Saturday meetings virtually disappeared.”
Since Richard Titmuss’ The Gift Relationship: From Blood Donations to Social Policy,
economists have been intrigued but for the most part unpersuaded by the claim that policies
based on explicit economic incentives may be counter-productive when they induce people to
adopt a ‘market mentality’ and thus compromise pre-existing values to act in socially
beneficial ways (Arrow (1972), Bliss (1972), Solow (1971) ). At the time of its publication
there were two strong reasons to doubt Titmuss’ claim. First, there was little hard evidence
that the social preferences such as altruism, fairness, and civic duty that are said to be eclipsed
by economic incentives are important influences on individual behavior. Second, even if these
social preferences were thought to be important influences on behavior, there was even less
evidence (in the Titmuss (1971) book or elsewhere) that explicit economic incentives
undermine them. As a result it was not implausible to hope that social preferences and selfinterest might contribute additively to the implementation of desirable social outcomes, or
even in complementary ways. One could agree with Arrow (1971) that “norms of social
behavior, including ethical and moral codes (may) ...compensate for market failures” and not
worry that explicit economic incentives designed to overcome market failures might
compromise social norms and hence be ineffective or even counter-productive.
Theoretical and empirical advances over the intervening years provide the basis for a
reconsideration of these issues. First, evidence from both the behavioral experimental
laboratory and the field has demonstrated that social preferences are important influences on
economic behavior (Bewley (1999), Camerer and Fehr (2004), Fehr and Falk (2002), Fehr
and Gachter (2000), Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007), Frey and Jegen (2001), Young and
Burke (2001)).
Second, the importance of incomplete contracts has been widely recognized and studied
empirically (Laffont and Matoussi (1995), Stiglitz (1987), Tirole (1999)). Partly as a result,
the terms trust, reciprocity, fairness, gift exchange and social capital now appear in the
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modeling and empirical study of principal-agent relationships, the provision of public goods,
and other standard economic applications, often referring to the social norms that underwrite
mutually beneficial exchange, consistent with Arrow’s observation (Akerlof (1984), Benabou
and Tirole (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)).
Third, we may soon be able to isolate the neurological bases of the sometimes
counterproductive effects of explicit incentives. Recent advances in brain imaging and other
techniques have provided provisional identification of distinct brain regions whose activation
is associated with the expression of social preferences (Greene, et al. (2001), Rilling, et al.
(2002), Sanfey, et al. (2003)) and provided evidence that explicit incentives diminish activity
in these social reward networks (Li, et al. (2008)).
Fourth, economists have increasingly turned to the study of cases in which preferences
are not exogenous but rather are shaped by individuals’ economic and other experiences,
including their exposure to incentives of differing types (Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005),
Becker (1996), Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bowles (1998)).
Finally, beginning with the Lucas Critique of the exogenous beliefs assumption in
macroeconomic policy, advances in the theory of public policy have addressed cases in which
incentives affect both beliefs and preferences and may thus have unintended effects (Aaron
(1994), Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005), Bowles (1989, (2004), Cervellati, Esteban and
Kranich (2008), Frey (1997), Lucas (1976), Sobel (2005), Taylor (1987)).
Here we extend the logic of the Lucas Critique to questions of framing, motivations,
and social norms, in short, to preferences. To do this we modify the standard public
economics and mechanism design assumption that taxes, subsidies, and other explicit
incentives affect behavior only indirectly, that is by altering the economic costs and benefits
of the targeted activities. In this conventional approach explicit incentives thus do not appear
directly in the citizen's utility function and as a result, the behavioral effects of explicit
economic incentives and social preferences are separable, the effects of each being
independent of the levels of the other. We modify the citizen’s utility function so that this
separability property need not hold and as a result the two kinds of motivations may be either
complements -- social preferences being heightened by incentives appealing to self-interest -or substitutes, when explicit incentives are said to crowd out social preferences.
Our concern is not with the importance of other-regarding motives, but rather the
plausibility of the separability assumption. Because it is so often implicit, it may help to
identify what may be its first explicit statement by John Stuart Mill (1844): 97
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[Political economy] does not treat of the whole of man's nature...,... it is concerned with
him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth,… it predicts only such
...phenomena ...as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire
abstraction of every other human passion or motive.
Incentives may have counter-intuitive and counter productive effects for reasons other
than non-separability (Seabright (2009)). Strong monetary incentives, for example, may overmotivate an agent leading to greater than the optimal level of arousal posited by the so called
Yerkes-Dodson law. This appears to be the mechanism underlying the negative effects of high
incentives found in three experiments by Ariely, et al. (2005). Similarly, if agents have an
income target, monetary incentives may allow target attainment with less effort. Camerer, et
al. (1997) suggest that this may explain why New York City taxi drivers work fewer hours
when they are making more per hour. Neither of these mechanisms involves the nonseparability of self-regarding and other regarding preferences, which is the focus of this
paper.
The experimental evidence for non-separability that we survey here would not be very
interesting if it did not reflect real-life behavior. Testing for separability in natural settings is
difficult, but generalizing directly from experiments even for phenomena much simpler than
separability is often unwarranted (Levitt and List (2007)). Consider, for example, the Dictator
Game in which a one subject (the dictator) is assigned an endowment of money and asked to
allocate some portion of it (including none) to a passive recipient. Typically more than 60%
of subjects allocate a positive sum to the recipient, and the average given is about a fifth of the
endowment. We would be sadly mistaken if we inferred from this that 60 percent of
individuals would spontaneously transfer funds to an anonymous passer by, or that the same
subjects would offer a fifth of the bills in their wallet to a homeless person asking for help.
Subjects who reported that they had never given to a charity allocated 60 percent of their
endowment to a named charity in a lab experiment (Benz and Meier (2006)).
Most individuals are strongly influenced by the cues of appropriate behavior offered
by the situation in which an action is taken (Ross and Nisbett (1991)), and there is no reason
to think that experiments are an exception to this context-dependent aspect of individual
behavior. Validity concerns arise from four aspects of human behavioral experiments that do
not arise in most well-designed natural science experiments. First, experimental subjects
typically know they are under an unknown researcher’s microscope, possibly inducing
different behaviors than would occur under total anonymity or under the scrutiny of
neighbors, family or workmates. Second, interactions with other subjects are typically
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anonymous and without opportunities for ongoing face to face communication, unlike many
social interactions. Third, subject pools may be quite different from the real-world
populations of interest, in part due to the process of recruitment and self selection (Calónico,
et al. (2007), Cardenas and Carpenter (2008)). Finally, many of the experiments that provide
evidence for the salience of social preferences are deliberately structured as strategic
interactions like the Ultimatum Game that give scope for ethical or other-regarding behavior
that may be absent in competitive markets and other important real world settings (Sobel
(2007)).
It is impossible to know whether these four aspects of behavioral experiments bias
experimental results in ways relevant to the question of separability. For example, the fact that
in most cases subjects are paid a “show up fee” to participate in an experiment might attract
the more materially oriented who may be less motivated by other-regarding preferences
subject to crowding out. But the fact that many of the subject pools are students who have not
faced the hard choices of making a living might work in the opposite direction. While
warranting caution in generalizing the details of experimental behavior to the real world, none
of these validity concerns is sufficient to dismiss the experimental evidence that social
preferences are important behavioral motivations and that the salience of these preferences
may be affected by explicit incentives. This is especially the case when experiments identify
motives that allow a consistent explanation of otherwise anomalous real world examples of
crowding in or out, such as those mentioned in our concluding section.
In the next section we provide a taxonomy of cases where separability of social and
self-regarding preferences does not hold. Because people often react to the mere presence of
explicit incentives rather than just their extent (Gneezy (2003)), we distinguish between
categorical and marginal effects. In the subsequent four sections we consider reasons why
crowding out may occur and provide experimental evidence about four mechanisms that we
think are involved. These are, first, the fact that incentives provide information affecting the
behavior of the target in ways additional to the effects on the material costs and benefits of the
target’s actions; second, the cues to appropriate behavior provided by incentives, third, the
ways that incentives may compromise self determination and crowd out intrinsic motives, and
fourth, the effects of incentives on preferences that may persist over long periods even in the
subsequent absence of the incentives (we reserve the term endogenous preferences for these
durable learning effects). Our penultimate section surveys studies in which crowding in
occurs. We conclude with some implications for policy and institutional design.
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2. Incentives and social preferences as complements or substitutes
Consider an individual who may bear a cost to take an action that confers benefits on
others. Taking the action may be encouraged by a subsidy or other explicit incentives (namely
those that affect the expected material costs and benefits associated with the action.) Citizens
also have "values" that may motivate taking pro-social actions, the term encompassing both
ethical commitments and other-regarding preferences such as altruism. Where separability
does not hold, there are some interaction effects between values and explicit incentives and
the behavioral effects of these values may be influenced (positively or negatively) by the use
of explicit incentives.
To see how, assume that for a given individual the extent the action (denoted by a) and
both explicit incentives (s) and the intensity of values (λ0) can be represented by a single
number. Then we describe their interrelationships by a function governing the individual's
choice of an action: a* = μ( s, λ0). Separability means that the effect of varying each of the
arguments of μ is independent of the level of the other argument.
Non-separability may be either marginal (the effect of incentives on values depending
continuously on the extent of the former) or categorical (the presence of incentives affecting
values independently of their level) or a combination of the two. The presence of these
discontinuous effects requires a more general definition of separability than the standard one,
namely that the cross-partial derivative of μ( s, λ0 ) be zero. Letting Δs and Δλ0 represent
arbitrary changes in incentives and values, separability implies that ΔT, the effect on a* of
varying both s and λ0 is equal to ΔS, the sum of the effects of varying each separately where
(1)

ΔT ≡ μ( s+Δs, λ0+ Δλ0 ) - μ( s,λ0 ) and
ΔS ≡ μ( s+Δs, λ0 ) + μ( s, λ0+ Δλ0 ) - 2μ( s, λ0 )

Where ΔT > ΔS then incentives and social preferences are synergistic and are termed
complements. Where the reverse is true the two arguments are substitutes (or are said to
exhibit “negative synergy” or “crowding out”). Table 1 summarizes the relevant definitions
and gives terms commonly used to refer to violations of separability.
[Table 1 here]
For simplicity, we study a single member of a community (indexed by j) who may
contribute to a public project by taking an action aj at a cost g(aj) that is increasing and convex
in its argument. The output of the project is available in equal measure to all, and it varies
positively and linearly with A, the sum of the n members’ contributions, according to φ(A).
The explicit incentive designed by a social planner (s ≥0) is a payment to the individual that is
proportional to the amount the individual contributes (known to the planner).
6

We express the individual's values as an addition to utility that is proportional to the
level of contribution, and (ignoring the individual’s superscript) we make explicit the sources
of non-separability as:
(2)

v = a λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2s)

where the indicator function 1{s>0} = 1 if s > 0 and zero otherwise. In section 5 we study the
manner in which incentives constitute part of the environment in which individuals update
their preferences, and we extend this representation of the contemporaneous effects of
incentives to include cases in which the λ’s depend on past values of s. In equation (2) as
before λ0 ≥ 0 measures the intensity of values, λ1 (which may be of either sign) measures the
categorical effect of the presence of an incentive on values that is independent of the level of
the incentive, and λ2 (which also may be of either sign) measures the marginal (rather than
categorical) effect of variations in s on values. The individual's utility is thus
(3)

u = φ(A) - g(a) + a (s + λ0(1 + 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s))

and the individual's utility maximizing contribution (a*) equates the marginal cost of
contributing to the marginal benefits, or:
(4)

g'(a*) = φ + s + λ0(1 + 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s)

Assuming that g(a) is just ½(a)2 so as to permit a closed form expression for the individual's
choice of contribution we have:
(5)

a* = μ( s, λ0 ) = φ + s + λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s)

and the effect of variations in s on the individual’s actions is given by
(6)

Δa* = Δs (1 + λ0λ2) + 1{s=0}λ0λ1
Then using the fact that 1{s=0} + 1{s>0} = 1 we have

(7)

ΔT = (φ + s + Δs + ( λ0 +Δλ0 )( 1+λ1 + λ2( s +Δs ))) - (φ + s + λ0(1 +1{s>0}λ1 +λ2 s))
= Δs (1+ λ0 λ2) + Δλ0 (1 +λ1 +λ2 s) + Δλ0Δsλ2 + 1{s=0}λ0λ1

(8)

S

Δ = (φ + s +Δs + λ0(1+λ1+ λ2( s + Δs ))) + (φ + s + ( λ0 + Δλ0 )(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s))
- 2( φ + s + λ0(1+ 1{s>0}λ1 + λ2 s))
= Δs (1+ λ0 λ2) + Δλ0 (1 +1{s>0}λ1 +λ2 s) + λ01{s=0}λ1

Equality of ΔT and ΔS and hence separability obtains if
(9) ΔT - ΔS = Δλ0 (Δsλ2 +1{s=0}λ1) = 0
In (9) the first term in the parenthesis captures non-additivity due to marginal non-separability
and the second, non-additivity due to categorical non-separability. Figure 1 illustrates the two
forms of non-separability.
[Figure 1 here]
Using (6) we say that a particular change in incentives Δs has crowded out values if
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Δa*/Δs < 1, and conversely for the case of crowding in. Strong crowding out holds if
Δa*/Δs < 0. Note that crowding out does not require that the effect of the incentive be
negative, only that it be less than would be the case if additivity held. This is illustrated in
Figure 1 where for s > s′ the incentive has a positive effect on contributions (compared to s =
0) in the presence of either marginal (non-strong) crowding out or categorical crowding out.
A recent experiment allows an estimate of both categorical and marginal crowding out.
Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) implemented a public goods experiment in which the 192
German students faced three conditions: no incentives to contribute and a bonus given to the
highest contributing individual that was either high or low (details are in Table 2, results are
shown in Figure 2). In the no-incentive case contributions averaged 48 percent above the
Nash equilibrium (25) that would have occurred if the participants had been motivated only
by the material rewards of the public project. Contributions in the low-bonus case were not
significantly different from the no-bonus treatment. In the high-bonus case significantly
higher contributions occurred, but the amount contributed barely (and insignificantly) differed
from that predicted for self-regarding subjects.
[Figure 2 here]
In Figure 2 we use the observed behavior in the high and low bonus case to estimate the
marginal effect of the bonus, finding that a unit increase in the bonus is associated with a 0.31
increase in contributions. This contrasts with the marginal effect of 0.42 that would have
occurred under separability. Crowding out thus affected a 26 percent reduction in the
marginal effect of the incentive. The estimated response to the incentive also gives us the
level of categorical crowding out, namely the observed contributions (37.04) minus the
predicted contributions had an arbitrarily small incentive been in effect (the vertical intercept
of the observed line in figure 2) or 34.56. The incentive thus categorically crowded out 21
percent of the effect of social preferences (measured by the excess in contribution levels
above Nash equilibrium for self interested subjects, 12.04.)
Categorical crowding out is also evident in three experiments by Heyman and Ariely
(2004). For example reported willingness to help a stranger load a sofa into a van was much
lower under a small money incentive than with no incentive at all, yet a moderate incentive
increased the willingness to help (over the no incentive condition). Using these data as we did
in the Irlenbusch and Ruchala study, we estimate that the mere presence of the incentive
reduced the willingness to help by 27 percent (compared to the no incentive condition).
Cardenas (2004) also implemented an experiment that allows us to estimate both
categorical and marginal crowding, but here (as in some other experiments) we observe
8

categorical crowding in. He implemented a Common Pool Resource Game in which
individuals choose how much to withdraw from a mutually beneficial common pool
analogous to a forest. The subjects, a group of Colombian users of rural ecosystems, faced
three conditions: no incentives, and a fine for overexploitation of the “forest” that could be
either very high or low with a 20 percent probability of being monitored (details are in Table
3, results are shown in Figure 3). In the no-incentive case the average level of extraction was
44 percent below the Nash equilibrium that would have occurred if the participants had been
motivated only by the material rewards of extracting from the common pool (8). The level of
extraction in the low-fine case was significantly different from the no-fine treatment and 55
percent below the Nash equilibrium of self-interested subjects. The high-fine induced a small
but statistically significantly further reduction in extractions, but the amount extracted was 34
percent above the Nash equilibrium predicted for self-regarding subjects. The high fine
produced anti-social behavior: subjects sacrificed individual gain in order to over-exploit the
forest.
In Figure 3 we show the predicted outcomes for self-regarding subjects (the red dashed
line) and for hypothetical subjects with the level of other-regarding preferences observed in
the no incentive condition and with separable preferences (the solid blue line). We use the
observed behavior in the high and low fine case to estimate a constant marginal effect of the
fine, finding that a unit increase in the fine is associated with a 0.002 decrease in extractions.
This contrasts with the marginal decrease of 0.04 that would have occurred under separability.
Crowding out thus reduced the marginal effect of the incentive expected under separability by
95 percent. The estimated response to the incentive also gives us an estimate of categorical
crowding, namely the difference between the level of extraction in the no incentive condition
(4.5) and the predicted level of extraction had an arbitrarily small incentive been in effect (the
vertical intercept of the observed line in figure 3) or 2.82). Thus while the marginal effect of
the fine was essentially zero, its mere presence appears to have augmented social preferences
by 48 percent (measured by the increase in the extent under-extraction levels below self
interested Nash equilibrium in the presence of the fine by comparison to that observed in the
no incentive condition). In this case the fine did not work as an incentive, but in Cardenas’
view rather as a signal alerting subjects to the public good nature of the interaction. Related
results are reported in section 7.
[Figure 3 here]
Many experiments provide evidence of strong crowding out but cannot distinguish the
blunted marginal incentives of marginal crowding out from additivity or even crowding in.
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The reason is that unlike the Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) and Cardenas (2004) studies, they
do not establish the response to incentives that would be observed under separability and thus
are able to detect only strong crowding out (based on the sign of the effect) and not weak
(based on the size of the effect). Thus had Cardenas implemented only the low fine, the level
of extraction based on the social preferences observed in the no incentive condition (4.5) plus
the additive marginal effect of the incentives (for a self interested individual) would have
almost exactly predicted the low fine contribution, apparently confirming separability. A
common misinterpretation of these experiments is that Δa*/Δs > 0, as was found in the
Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) experiment or similar findings that an incentive had an effect
in the intended direction, is evidence against crowding out (Rigdon (2009)).
What are the cognitive or affective effects of incentives that explain the categorical and
marginal crowding out observed in this and other experiments? Few experiments have thus far
been designed to answer this question, so the inferences that we draw in the next four sections
must be provisional. The experimental methods that have become standard in economics
include playing for real stakes, excluding deception, and making explicit use of game
theoretic concepts to clarify the role of incentives. As experimental methods differ
considerably across disciplines, and for reasons of space we limit the entries in the tables to
experiments done by economists, although we are concerned we may be missing relevant
literature provided by other disciplines. All of those studies include baselines to ascertain
whether the incentives led to changes in subject’s decisions. We refer to a number of
important experiments done using other methods in the text.
3. Incentives provide information
Incentives are implemented for a purpose, and because the purpose is often evident to
the target of the incentives, the target may also infer information about the person who
designed the incentive, about his or her beliefs concerning the target, and the nature of the
task to be done (Benabou and Tirole (2003), Fehr and Rockenbach (2003)). We will illustrate
this incentives-as-signals mechanism by the contrasting positive response to fines imposed by
peers in public goods experiments and negative response to fines imposed by experimental
‘investors’ and ‘employers’ in a principal agent experiment.
German students in the role of "investor" chose a costly action benefiting the other
player, called the "trustee," who, knowing the investor’s choice, could in turn provide a
personally costly “back-transfer,” returning a benefit to the investor (Fehr and Rockenbach
(2003).) When the investor transferred money to the trustee, he or she also specified a desired
10

level of the back-transfer. The experimenters implemented an incentive condition in which the
investor had the option of declaring that he would impose a fine if the trustee’s back-transfer
were less than the desired amount. The investor could also decline the use of the fine, the
choice of using or declining the fine option being taken prior to the trustee’s decision. There
was also a “trust” condition in which no such incentives were available to the investor.
Trustees reciprocated generous initial transfers by investors with greater back transfers.
But the use of the fine reduced return transfers conditional on the investor’s transfer, while
renouncing the use of the fine when it was available to the investor increased back transfers.
Only one-third of the investors renounced the fine; their payoffs were 50 percent greater than
the investors who threatened use of the fines.
The proximate causes of the negative impact of incentives in this case are suggested by
evidence on the neural responses of the trustees in a Trust Game (Li, et al. (2008).) As in the
experiment of Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) the investor’s threat of sanctions negatively
affected back transfers by trustees. To identify the proximate causes of this result, Li and his
co-authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the activation of
distinct brain regions of trustees when faced with an investor who had threatened to sanction
the trustee for insufficient back transfers and an investor who had not threatened a sanction.
Threatened sanctions de-activated the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC, a brain area
correlated with higher repayment in this experiment) as well as other areas relating to the
processing of social rewards. The threat activated the parietal cortex, an area thought to be
associated with cost-benefit analysis and other self-interested optimizing. The interpretation
by Li and his co authors is that the sanctions induced a “perception shift” favoring a more
self-interested response.
The signaling interpretation suggested by Fehr and Rockenbach is that in the trust
condition, or when the fine was renounced by the investor, a large initial transfer signaled that
the investor trusted the trustee. The positive response of the trustee is a categorical effect,
analogous to the negative categorical effect of the use of incentives described above. The
threat of the fine, however, conveyed a different message and extinguished the trustee’s
reciprocity. This was especially the case when it appeared that the intent of the fine was to
impose what the trustee considered to be an unfair outcome. Where the investor had
announced modest levels of desired returns such that the investor and the trustee would both
substantially share in the benefits, the use of the fines reduced back transfers by an
insignificant 8 percent. But where the announced desired back-transfer would have allowed
the investor to capture most of the benefits had the trustee complied, the reduction in back
11

transfers was 38 percent. It appears that the use of the fine in these conditions signaled the
unfair intent of the investor, rather than simply his distrust of the trustee.
The fact that in this latter case incentives revealed that the principal is untrusting or selfaggrandizing helps explain the contrasting effect of incentives imposed by peers who do not
stand to benefit personally. An example is the Public Goods experiment in which fellow
group members have the opportunity to reduce their own payoffs in order to punish (reduce
the payoffs of) others in their group once each member's contributions are revealed. In this
experiment group membership is shuffled so that a punisher could not benefit from the target's
response in subsequent periods. Punishment thus is an altruistic act as it benefits others at the
expense of the punisher and hence it cannot be interpreted as a signal of unfair intent. In this
setting there is a strong positive response by low contributors (Fehr and Gachter (2000), Fehr
and Gaechter (2002a), Masclet, et al. (2003)).
Although there is no direct evidence, a plausible explanation of the effectiveness of
incentives imposed on low contributors by peers at a personal cost to themselves is that when
punished, those who have contributed less than others interpret the punishment as a signal of
public-spirited social disapproval and feel shame, which they redress by subsequently
contributing more. In this case the incentive (prospect of peer imposed fines) has crowded in
social preferences, a possibility we return to in section 7. Table 2 summarizes experiments in
which this incentives-as-signals effect appears to have been at work (in some cases along with
other mechanisms, to which we now turn.)
[Table 2 here]
4. Incentives may suggest appropriate behavior
In most situations people look for clues of appropriate behavior (Ross and Nisbett
(1991), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), Tversky and Kahneman (1981)) and incentives often
provide them. In Table 3 we survey experiments in which this appears to have been the case.
[Table 3 here]
Hoffman, et al. (1994) illustrated the power of names: generosity and fair-minded
behavior were diminished by simply re-labeling an Ultimatum Game the “Exchange Game”
and re-labeling proposers and responders “sellers” and “buyers”. The power of names has
been confirmed in many (but not all) experiments since then (cited in Ellingsen, et al. (2008),
Rege and Telle (2004), Zhong, Loewenstein and Murnighan (2007)).
But literally naming the game is not necessary. Incentives alone may provide powerful
frames for the decision maker. Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) found that market-like
competition for “survival” among subjects reduced their concern for fairness in an Ultimatum
12

Game experiment. In this game Player 1 is given an endowment and asked to propose a
division of it with Player 2. Player 2, knowing the size of the endowment, decides whether to
accept or reject the division. If Player 2 accepts, then the proposed division is implemented. If
Player 2 rejects both players receive zero. When subjects were told that those with lower
earnings would be excluded from a second round of the game, those in the role of Player 1
offered less generous amounts to Player 2, and Player 2 accepted lower offers. The authors’
interpretation was that: “...the competition inherent in markets...offers justifications for
actions that, in isolation, would be unjustifiable.” While plausible, direct evidence for this
“crowding out of ethical reasoning” explanation is lacking because the social preferences that
accounted for fair behavior in the non-survival condition were not measured. There are cases,
however, in which the reduction in the salience of ethical reasoning induced by the presence
of incentives can be identified. An example follows.
A large team of anthropologists and economists implemented both Dictator and
Third Party Punishment Games in 15 societies ranging from Amazonian, Arctic and African
hunter gatherers to manufacturing workers in Accra, Ghana and U.S undergraduates (Barr, et
al. (2009), Henrich, et al. (2009).) In the Dictator Game an experimental subject is assigned a
sum of money and asked to allocate some all or none of it to a passive recipient. The Third
Party Punishment Game is a Dictator Game with an active onlooker (the third party) who
observes the dictator’s allocation. If the third party deems the dictator’s allocation worthy of
punishment he or she may then pay to impose a monetary fine on the dictator. Though one
would expect that the dictators in the presence of a third party would adjust their allocations
upwards (compared to the two party game) so as to avoid being fined, fining was common; it
occurred in 30% of the interactions across the study sites.
Surprisingly, in only two of the 15 populations were the offers significantly higher in
the Third Party Punishment Game than in the Dictator Game, and in four of the populations
the allocations were significantly (and in some cases substantially) lower. In Accra, for
example, where 41 percent of the dictator’s allocations resulted in fines by the third party, the
allocations were 30 per cent lower (t = -6.8) in the Third Party Punishment Game than in the
Dictator Game. The incentives provided by the fine did not induce higher allocations, but
rather had the opposite effect. (The fact that for two groups there was a significant positive
effect of the fine option indicates that the incentive had some effect, but as we have seen does
not preclude crowding out.)
Crowding out of ethical motives is suggested by the fact that the dictator’s adherence
to one of the worlds religion (Islam or Christianity, including Russian Orthodoxy) raised
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allocations in the Dictator Game by 23 percent (t = 3.5, compared to those unaffiliated with a
world religion). In the Third Party Punishment Game with the very same individuals the
estimated religion effect was one tenth as large and was not significantly different form zero.
In the Accra sample the Dictator’s allocation was increasing in the frequency of attendance at
church or mosque in the two party game; but this “religion effect” vanished in the Third Party
Punishment Game. The presence of the incentive based on the fine appears to have defined
the setting as one in which the moral teachings of these religions were not relevant.
5. Incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination
A rich experimental and theoretical literature (and ongoing debate) in psychology has
explored the crowding out of intrinsic motives (Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001), Deci,
Koestner and Ryan (1999), Deci and Ryan (1985).) Recent experiments by economists
surveyed in Table 4 as well as non-experimental studies in economics (surveyed in Frey and
Jegen (2001)) provide evidence for a third reason for the self interest and other regarding
preferences may be substitutes rather than additive or complements. The underlying
psychological mechanism appears to be a fundamental desire for “feelings of competence and
self-determination” that are associated with intrinsically motivated behavior (Deci (1975)).
According to this interpretation, where people derive pleasure from an action per se in the
absence of other rewards, the introduction of explicit incentives may 'over-justify' the activity
and reduce the individual's sense of autonomy.
[Table 4 here]
Consistent with this “self-determination” model, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) used a Gift
Exchange Game to explore the idea that ‘control aversion’ may be a reason why incentives
degrade performance. Experimental agents in a role similar to an employee chose a level of
‘production’ that was costly to them and beneficial to the principal (the employer). The
agent's choice effectively determined the distribution of gains between the two, with the
agent’s maximum payoff occurring if he produced nothing. Before the agent's decision, the
principal could elect to leave the choice of the level of production completely to the agent's
discretion, or impose a lower bound on the agent's production (three bounds were varied by
the experimenter across treatments, the principal’s choice was simply whether or not to
impose it.) The principal could infer that a self-regarding agent would perform at the lower
bound or, in the absence of the bound, at zero, and thus imposition of the bound would
maximize the principal’s payoffs.
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But in the experiment agents chose a lower level of production when the principal
imposed the bound. Apparently anticipating this response, fewer than a third of the principals
opted for its imposition in the moderate or low bound treatments. This minority of
“untrusting” principals earned on average half of the profits of those who did not seek to
control the agents' choice in the low bound treatment, and a third less in the intermediate
bound condition.
Control aversion and the desire for self-determination are not the only effects of the
principal’s seeking to bind the agent. As anticipated by our discussion of the information
content of incentives above, the imposition of the minimum in this experiment gave the
agents remarkably accurate information about the principals' beliefs concerning the agents. In
post-play interviews, most agents agreed with the statement that the imposition of the lower
bound was a signal of distrust and those who imposed the bound in fact had substantially
lower expectations of the agents. Their consequent attempt to control the agents' choices
induced over half of the agents (in all three treatments) to contribute minimally, thereby
affirming the principals' pessimism. Depending on the distribution of principal’s priors about
the agents, a population with preferences similar to these experimental subjects could support
both trusting and untrusting (Pareto-inefficient) equilibria.
6. Incentives alter the environment in which new preferences are learned
Incentives may also affect long-term change in motivations because they alter key
aspects of how we acquire our motivations including both the range of alternative preferences
to which one is exposed and the economic rewards and social status of those with preferences
different from one's own (Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005), Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bowles
(2004)). For example, suppose the relevant incentives allow the self-regarding to exploit the
civic-minded. Then if the learning process is payoff-monotonic the civic-minded are likely to
be eliminated. Other effects are less obvious: a competitive market with complete contracts
leaves little scope for acting on ethical, reciprocal or generous preferences, even among those
so inclined (Sobel (2007)). If preference change is closely related to exposure to alternative
models as overwhelming evidence suggests (Zajonc (1968)), then this idealized market
environment would provide little basis for the proliferation of non-self-regarding preferences.
Experiments of at most a few hours duration are unlikely to uncover the causal
mechanisms involved in preference change. This is because adopting new preferences is often
a slow process more akin to acquiring an accent than to choosing an action in a game. The
developmental processes involved typically include population-level effects such as
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conformism, schooling, religious instruction and other forms of socialization that are not
readily captured in experiments. Acquiring new preferences (like accents) often takes place
early in the life cycle is strongly attenuated thereafter.
However, historical, anthropological, social psychological and other data (surveyed in
Bowles (1998)) provide evidence for endogenous preferences, showing that economic
structures affect parental child rearing values, personality traits rewarded by higher grades in
school, and other developmental influences. Additional evidence comes from the
experimental studies of 15 small scale societies with extraordinarily varied economic
structures ranging from farming to hunting and gathering. In these studies cross subject pool
comparisons showed a strong association between the nature of the diverse economic tasks
required to secure a livelihood in a society and its members’ behavior in the Ultimatum Game
(Henrich, et al. (2005)).
Despite the limitations of experiments for the investigation of preference change, we
survey in Table 5 a number of experiments that have documented durable learning effects. In
many cases the effect of incentives on preferences persists even after incentives are
withdrawn. Equation (2) can be modified to examine these and other cases of long term
effects of incentives on social preferences, namely:
(2a)

v = a λ0(s)(1+ 1{s>0}λ1(s) + s λ2(s))

where s represents a measure of exposure to incentives in the past. An example follows.
In the public goods experiment designed by Falkinger, et al. (2000) an incentive system
induced subjects to contribute almost exactly the amount predicted for a own-material-payoffmaximizing individual, while in the absence of the incentive subjects contributed significantly
more than would have been optimal for a payoff maximizing individual. But subjects who had
previously experienced the incentive system contributed 26 per cent less than those who had
never experienced it.
[Table 5 here]
7. Incentives and social preferences as complements
Crowding in may also occur. In Table 6 we survey a number of studies that show this
result. We have already seen that fines imposed on free riders by altruistic peers in a Public
Goods Game induce higher levels of contribution in subsequent rounds of play. Of course
crowding in need not have been involved; individuals might have simply best-responded to
the anticipated loss in payoffs associated with low contributions. But more than this appears
to be at work. Consistent with the interpretation that incentives imposed by peers activate
shame, purely verbal messages of disapproval have a substantial positive effect on free riders’
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subsequent contributions (Barr (2001), Masclet, et al. (2003).) When those who have
contributed more than others are punished (as sometimes occurs, Herrmann, Gaechter and
Thoni (2008)), they subsequently contribute less, and costly retaliatory punishment
escalations sometimes result (Bowles and Gintis (2006), Carpenter, et al. (2009), Hopfensitz
and Reuben (2006).) This appears to occur because the targets of the punishment feel hostility
rather than shame.
[Table 6 here]
Incentives thus may recruit social preferences rather than dampening them. But other
mechanisms are at work: social norms support the observance of traffic regulations, but these
may unravel in the absence of state-imposed sanctions on flagrant violators. The rule of law
and other institutional designs that limit the more extreme forms of anti-social behavior and
facilitate mutually beneficial interactions on a large scale may enhance the salience of social
preferences by assuring people that those who conform to moral norms will not be exploited
by their self-interested fellow citizens.
This phenomenon may have been at work among the Hokkaido University subjects who
cooperated more in a public goods experiment when assured that others who did not
cooperate would be punished (Shinada and Yamagishi (2007)) despite the fact that this had no
effect on their own material incentives. They apparently wanted to be cooperative but wished
even more to avoid being the sucker who is exploited by defectors. Market incentives may
also favor the endogenous evolution of social preferences. In two sets of experiments in 15
small-scale societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Henrich, et al. (2005), Henrich, et al.
(2009)), the experience of mutually beneficial exchanges with strangers may explain why, in
anonymous experimental settings, individuals from the more market-integrated societies gave
more in the Ultimatum Game.
A distinct mechanism underlying crowding in was apparently at work in a public goods
experiment by Galbiati and Vertova (2008b). Consistent with the Cardenas experiment
presented in figure 3, they found that the effect of a stated (non-binding) obligation to
contribute a certain amount was greater when it was combined with a weak monetary
incentive than when no incentives were offered. The monetary incentives had no effect on
behavior in the absence of the stated obligation. The authors’ interpretation is that the explicit
incentives enhanced the salience of the stated obligation.
8. Conclusions: Puzzles and lessons
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While competing interpretations are plausible for many of these experiments it would
nonetheless be difficult, in light of these data, to sustain the implicit separability assumption
adopted in many economic models. The most plausible explanation for the failure of the
separability assumption is that when people engage in trade, produce goods and services, save
and invest they are not only attempting to get things, they are also trying to be someone, both
in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. Incentives addressed to our acquisitive desires
appear to dampen or impede the pursuit of our constitutive aspirations. Among the reasons,
we have seen are that in addition to affecting the costs and benefits of an action, incentives
also provide information about the person imposing the incentive, suggest appropriate
behavior by framing decision situations, may compromise the target’s sense of autonomy,
alter the environments in which we learn new preferences, and alter beliefs about what other
agents will do.
This may explain why incentives for settlement of conflicts may fail. Representative
samples of Jewish West Bank settlers in 2005, Palestinian refugees in 2005, and Palestinian
students in 2006 were asked how angry and disgusted they would feel or how supportive to
violence they might be if their political leaders were to compromise on contested issues
between the groups. Those who regarded their group’s claims (on Jerusalem, for example) as
reflecting “sacred values” (about half in each of the three groups) expressed far greater anger,
disgust and support for violence if the compromise were accompanied by a monetary
compensation for their own group than if no compensation were offered (Ginges, et al.
(2007)) Similar results were fund in a survey of the willingness of Swiss citizens to accept
environmental hazards (Frey and Stutzer (2006).)
John Stuart Mill (whose definition the boundaries of our discipline we mentioned at the
outset) and economists since have recognized that the purposes of individual economic action
are constitutive as well as acquisitive. But what some have missed is that our acquisitive and
constitutive motivations may not be separable. Jeremy Bentham’s Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), is arguably the first text in what we now call
public economics. In it he explained how proper incentives might align the private interests of
officials with their public duties. But he also understood the constitutive side of action and the
need to design incentives that are complements of the moral sentiments rather than
substitutes:
A punishment may be said to be calculated to answer the purpose of a moral lesson,
when by reason of the ignominy it stamps upon the offence, it is calculated to inspire the
public with sentiments of aversion towards those pernicious habits and dispositions with
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which the offence appears to be connected; and thereby to inculcate the opposite
beneficial habits and dispositions (Bentham (1789): p.26.)
The fact that punishments are “moral lessons” as well as incentives may help resolve
one of the puzzles in the literature we have just surveyed. In a widely cited natural
experiment, the imposition of fines on parents arriving late to pick up their children at day
care centers in Haifa resulted in a doubling of the number of tardy pickups (Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a)). But the small tax on plastic grocery bags enacted in Ireland in 2002 had
the opposite effect: it resulted in a 94 percent decline in their use and appeared to crowd in
pro-social preferences (Rosenthal (2008).).
The contrast is instructive. In the Haifa case, the experimenters (respecting standard
experimental protocols) provided no justification for the introduction of the fine on the
parents, whose occasional lateness could have occurred for reasons beyond the parents’
control rather than as the result of a disregard of the inconvenience it caused. Moreover
lateness was not so common as to be widely broadcast to the other parents. By contrast, the
introduction of the Irish plastic bag tax was preceded by a substantial publicity campaign, and
the use of the bags was the result of a simple choice made in a highly public condition. In the
Irish case, as in the experiment by Galbiati and Vertova (2008b), the monetary incentive was
introduced jointly with a message of explicit social obligation, and it apparently served as a
reminder of the larger social costs of the use and disposition of the bags. This contrast, along
with the fact mentioned above that fines imposed on low contributors by peers in Public
Goods Games have positive effects while fines imposed by principals on agents often
backfire, makes it clear that fines and other monetary incentives per se are not the cause of
crowding out. Rather what is critical is the meaning of the fines as conveyed by the social
relationships among the actors, the information the fine provides, and the pre-existing
normative frameworks of the actors.
Another lesson for mechanism design is that in implementing public policy or private
systems of incentives, the designer must consider the response of individuals’ motivations to
the instruments under consideration and take the predicted policy outcome to be the resulting
joint equilibrium of preferences and economic allocations. Perhaps surprisingly, the citizenutility-maximizing sophisticated planner cognizant of this motivational version of the Lucas
critique may make either greater or lesser use of explicit incentives when crowding out occurs
(Bowles and Hwang (2008), Fershtman and Heifetz (2006), Heifetz, Segev and Talley
(2007).)
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Figures
Separability
(λ1= λ2=0)
a =φ + λ0+ s

Action (a)

Self-regarding
contribution
(λ0=λ1=λ2=0)
a=φ+s

Marginal crowding out
(λ2<0, λ1=0)
a = φ + λ0 +s (1+ λ0λ2)

Categorical crowding out
(λ1<0, λ2=0)
a =φ + s + λ0(1+ λ1)

φ + λ0

φ
Strong (marginal) crowding out
(λ0λ2<-1, λ1=0)
a = φ + λ0 + s (1+ λ0λ2)

φ + λ0(1+ λ1)

Incentive (s)

s’

Figure 1. Citizen's contribution to the public good (a*) under non-separability of incentives and values. Shown are examples
of equation (5) under varying separability assumptions. Under separability (top line) categorical and marginal incentive
effects are additive. Under strong crowding out the use of the incentive is counterproductive; this holds for all levels of s
under the marginal crowding out function shown. Under categorical crowding out, incentives less than s' are also
counterproductive in the sense that contributions are less than they would have been in the absence of incentives.

Contribution
(α )

High Bonus

Low Bonus

62.04
53.12
52
50
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37.04

38.27

34.56
30
25
22
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12

60
Predicted contributions for Self-regarding subjects
Bonus Level (s )
Predicted contributions under separability
Observed Data -average contribution in each scheme
Figure 2. Categorical and marginal crowding out (from Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008)). Source: see text. The experimental
design is an adapted Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game comparing two team-based compensation schemes without
and with a relative reward (or bonus) for the highest contributor in the team. The bonus is self-funded (each member pays
one-forth of the bonus). Each subject simultaneously decides an effort level from the interval [0, 120].
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Low fine

High fine
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Fine Level (s )

Predicted extraction for Self-regarding subjects
-2.50
Predicted extraction under separability
Observed Data -average extraction in each scheme
Figure 3. Categorical and marginal crowding out (from Cardenas (2004)). Source: see text. The experimental design is an
adapted Common Pool Resources game comparing an external regulation (without and with a fine). Only 20 percent of the
players were monitored. Each subject simultaneously decides a level of extraction from the interval [0, 8].
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Tables
Table 1. Separability and its violations.
ΔT = Δ S

Separability, additivity

ΔT > Δ S

Complementarity, synergy, super-modularity, crowding in

ΔT < Δ S

Substitutability, negative synergy, sub-modularity, crowding out

Tables 2 to 6.
Note: The bold entries F, S, E and C indicate that the experiment in question could also have
been included in tables 3 (Framing) 4 (Self-determination) 5 (Endogenous preferences) or 6
(Complementary relations between incentives and social preferences). In those tables I
indicate that the experiment could have been included in this table (Information). All the
papers but those marked with an * are published or forthcoming in a publication.
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Table 2. Incentives provide information (I)
[01] Ariely,
Bracha and
Meier (2009)

Subjects
Games or
(number)
activities
Charity giving
U.S.
based on task
students
performance
(161)

[02] Irlenbusch
and Ruchala
(2008)

German
Students
(192)

[03] Borges and
Irlenbusch
(2007)

German
Students
(179)

[04] Dickenson
and Villeval
(2008)

French
students
(182)

Citation

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• An external form of enforcement:
With monetary compensation or
without;
• Donation choices are public or
private
• Different frames: "good" and
"bad" charitable causes

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
In the public treatment subjects exert more effort The signaling value of giving is
for a good cause and effort is substantially lower compromised by incentives. “Image
motivation is crowded out by monetary
in the incentive treatment. Monetary incentives
incentives [that are] more likely to be
increase effort in the private treatment.
counterproductive for public pro-social
activities than for private ones.” (p.1)
Categorical crowding out. See
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999), Mulder,
et al. (2006) and Upton (1974)
Public Goods • An external form of enforcement: High (but not low) bonuses increase average
Both categorical and marginal crowding
Game
Team-based compensation with and effort, and joint surplus increases significantly
out occur. The tournament structure
without a reward for the highest
only if the bonus is high, but decreases over time. reduces voluntary cooperation. F
contributor in the team
Only with the purely team-based compensation
(See text)
• The reward is a low or a high
(no individual incentives) do agents contribute
bonus
more than self interest would motivate. Pure
• Pure Individual bonus without
tournament incentives induce effort levels below
team-based compensation
the selfish Nash equilibrium prediction.
Buyer - Seller • Three rights of withdrawal: none, When sellers voluntarily offer a withdrawal right, “Buyers are more inclined to behave
buyers make order decisions that are less harmful fairly towards the sellers if they have
Game
voluntary offer of a right of
granted the withdrawal right voluntarily
for the seller than if the withdrawal right is
withdrawal (with a return cost for
than if it is constituted by law”. (p. 17)
imposed on sellers exogenously.
the seller) and imposed.
[because it is] “perceived ...as a generous
• The right of withdrawal when
act and they might feel inclined to
imposed has a return cost for the
reciprocate by not exploiting the seller.
buyer or not
…”. (p. 12). F
In the partner treatment, when employer payoffs While intrinsic motivation is evident in
Gift-Exchange • Stranger or Partner with
depend on employee effort less monitoring induce subject behaviors, in the Partner
Game with a
communication
computer task • Employer payoffs dependent on substantially higher performance. Consistent with relationship the effect of more
employee effort (variable) or not.
Frey (1993)
monitoring appears to be a reciprocitybased negative response to the
principal's lack of trust or intent to
benefit at the agent's expense. F, S
Results relevant to separability
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Table 2 continued…
Subjects
(number)
Italian
students (96)

Games or
activities
GiftExchange
Game

[06] Tyran and
Feld (2006)

Swiss
students
(102)

Public
Goods
Game

[07] Fehr and
List (2004)

Costa Rican
CEOs (126)
& students
(76)

Trust Game • Optional punishment as an
incentive contract (i.e. a fine if less
than the desired back-transfer
amount is returned)

[08] Fehr and
Rockenbach
(2003)

German
students
(238)

Trust Game • Optional punishment as a
incentive contract (i.e. a fine if less
than the desired back-transfer
amount is returned)

[09] Fehr and
Gaechter
(2002b) *

Swiss
students
(182)

GiftExchange
Game

Citation
[05] Stanca,
Bruni and
Corazzini
(2007) *

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• In the first move, Information
(player 1 knows there is a second
move) or No Information (player 1
does not know there is a second
move and hence thinks the game is
a Dictator Game)
• Levels of sanctions: none, mild
and severe
• Enforcement: external (i.e.
experimenter-imposed) or selfimposed (by referendum)

• Three external forms of
enforcement: A Trust (pure fixed
wage) contract, a price deduction
(i.e., fine) contract, and bonus
incentive contract

Results relevant to separability
Second movers’ amounts returned are more
correlated with the first mover’s amounts
sent in the No Information treatment.

Exogenously imposed mild law does not
significantly affect average contributions to
the public good. Compliance is much
improved if mild law is endogenously
chosen.
CEO principals trust more and are more
trustworthy than students and as a result
they achieve allocations closer to the
maximum surplus that could be generated
by the two parties. Joint surplus is highest
when the punishment option is available
and not used and lowest if the punishment
option is used.
Trustee's back-transfers are lower when
investors impose fines. Not using the
punishment option when it is available
results in larger back transfers and a larger
joint surplus.

Incentives reduce agent’s effort. If the
incentive is framed as a price deduction the
effort reduction is greater than where the
incentive is framed as a bonus. Incentives
reduce total surplus, increase principal’s
profits.
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Reciprocity is stronger in response to
actions that are perceived as driven by
intrinsic motivation, than to be in response
to actions that are perceived as extrinsically
motivated. F
If the enforcement is self-imposed it does
not indicate hostile intent and also induces
expectations of others’ cooperation (people
tend to comply with the law if they expect
many others to do so). If mild law is
rejected in the referendum, compliance
tends to be lower than without the law. F
Key to performance: “the psychological
message…conveyed by incentives –
whether ... kind or hostile...” (p. 745). See
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) [08]

Explicit incentives undermine altruistic
cooperation and reciprocity; forgoing the
punishment option is a signal of good will
and trust. See Fehr and List (2004) [07]
Negative effects of use of the punishment
option are greater when the investor
demands a larger share of the joint surplus.
Categorical crowding out when the investor
chooses the fine. F
Effects of incentives are due to the
perceived fairness, kindness and hostility of
the principal's action. F, S

Table 3. Incentives may suggest appropriate behavior (F)
Subjects
(number)
[10] Henrich, et al. 15 societies
Including US
(2009) and
students,
Barr, et al.
African
(2009) and
workers,
personal
communicatio Amazonian,
Arctic, and
n from Barr
and Henrich African
Hunterin March
gatherers.
2009
(428)
[11] Ellingsen, et Swedish
al. (2008) *
students
(668)
Citation

Games or
activities
Dictator
Game,
Ultimatum
Game and
Third-Party
Punishment
Game (TPG)

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Differences between societies
• Subjects played in the following
sequence keeping their role
(active or passive): first DG, then
the UG and finally the TPG (an
explicit incentive, i.e. fine)

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
In the TPG the incentives provided by the fine do The presence of the fine in the TPG
appears to have reduced the salience of
not induce higher offers, but rather have the
moral reasoning and enhanced subjects
opposite effect and factors that may influence
self-interest calculations (i.e. wealth, income and concerns with their own economic
needs.
household size) are significant predictors of
allocations (but not in the DG). Membership in a
‘world religion’ positively associated with offers
in the DG but not in the TPG

Prisoners’
dilemma
Game

• Two labels: Community Game
and the Stock Market Game
• Two types of interactions:
human - human and human –
computer (opponent’s choice of
action is made by a computer that
is programmed to play with the
same frequency as do subjects in
the human - human treatment)

Cooperation is higher with the Community Game
label than the Stock Market game label in the
human-human interaction. There is no such effect
in the human –computer interaction: there is no
labeling effect when subjects play against an
opponent who is unaware of the game, although
the opponent’s action is guaranteed to be
statistically identical to the actions of an informed
opponent.

• Different levels of the obligated
contribution (zero, low and high)
with a low level of explicit
incentives (i.e. a probability of
monitoring and a probabilistic
penalty or reward)
• Optional punishment as an
incentive contract (i.e. a monetary
sanction if less than the desired
back-transfer amount is returned)

Galbiati and
[12] Vertova
(2008b)

Italian
students
(210)

Public Goods
Game (and a
Lottery
Game)

[13] Li, et al.
(2008) *

US citizens
(104)

Trust Game

Results relevant to separability

Cooperative label does not suffice to
increase cooperation. People respond to
labels because the label affects how
others interpret their behavior, which in
turn determines their image. “people’s
behavior is constantly sensitive to whom
they are interacting with and what these
opponents will do and think” (p. 8). See
Zhong, et al. (2007), Ross and Samuels
(1993), Ross and Ward (1996)
When the obligated contribution required is high, Obligations (i.e. what formal rules ask
people to do) affect behavior
cooperation is significantly higher than in
independently of economic incentives. I
presence of low or null obligation, despite the
material incentives being identical in these cases.

Trustees reciprocate relatively less when facing
sanction threats, and the presence of sanctions
significantly reduces trustee’s brain activities
involved in social reward valuation (VMPFC,
LOFC, and amygdala), while simultaneously
significantly increasing activities in parietal
cortex previously implicated in economic
decision making.
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Monetary sanctions “encourage activity
within neural networks associated with
self-interested economic decision
making while simultaneously mitigating
activity in networks implicated in social
reward evaluation and processing” (p. 3)
I

Table 3 continued…
Subjects
(number)
Swedish
students
(262)

Games or
activities
Subjects are
offered to
carry out the
health exam to
become blood
donors

[15] Bohnet and
Baytelman
(2007)

Senior
executives
in U.S.
(353)

[16] Houser, et al.
(2008)

U.S.
students
(532)

Trust Game
and a Dictator
Game (for
trustors the
transfer is
tripled and for
trustees the
transfer does
not change)
Gift-Exchange
Game

[17] Fischbacher,
Fong and
Fehr (2005) *

Swiss
students
(238)

Ultimatum
Game

[18] Cardenas
(2004)

Colombian
users of
rural
ecosystems
(265)

Common Pool
Resource
Game

Citation
[14] Mellstrom
and
Johannesson
(2008)

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• With and without a monetary
compensation for becoming
blood donors
• To choose between a
monetary compensation and
donating the same amount to
charity
• No communication, face-toface pre-play communication
or post-play communication
• An external form of
enforcement (Post-play
monetary punishment or not)
• Stranger and Partner

Results relevant to separability
The incentive reduces the supply of
prospective blood donors from 52% to
30% among women. No effect among
men. Allowing individuals to donate the
payment to charity eliminates the
negative effect of the monetary
compensation.
Repetition and communication increase
amount sent and returned; the option of
punishment for low offers reduces offers
of other-regarding trustees (those who
send more in the Dictator Game)

• A form of enforcement
(Punishment as an incentive
contract (i.e. a fine))
• Intention treatment:
Punishment is assigned
exhogenously or imposed by
investors
• Buyer competition (one, two
or five Responders)
• Seller competition (one or
two Proposers)

When back-transfer requests are high in
relation to the sanction’s size, regardless
of whether the request is fair and
regardless of whether punishment is
intentional, punishment incentives have
detrimental effects on the amount
returned.
Buyer competition reduces mean
accepted offers and buyers' willingness to
reject.

• Different levels of external
enforcement (weak and
strong) with announcement of
socially optimal extraction
level and without
communication
• Communication without
fines and announcement.

Deviation from self interested behavior is
much greater under communication (no
fine) than under either high or low fines
without communication. The behavioral
effect of high (compared to low) fines is
less than 6 percent of the predicted effect
assuming self -regarding.
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The monetary incentive may make it more
difficult to signal social preferences,
diminishing the signaling value of
contributing. Charity option facilitates
signaling. Over-justification appears also to be
involved. See Upton (1974). I
"The availability of punishment destroys
intrinsic trust and lowers people’s willingness
to reward trust" (p.1) I

"Subjects interpret punishment as the price for
self-interested behavior and the price,
regardless of whether it was intentionally
imposed, is an excuse for selfishness" (p.15)
Categorical crowding out when the investor
chooses the fine. See Fehr and Rockenbach
(2003) [08] and Mulder, et al. (2006) I
Buyer competition makes punishment of
'unfair' offers less certain (buyers’
expectations about other buyers' acceptance is
less certain). Competition among responders
appears frame the interaction as market-like. S
Regardless the cost of the regulation (high or
low), 40 percent of decisions would
implement the social optimum, 30% are close
to the social optimum and 15% are equivalent
to the self-regarding prediction. Regulation
has no marginal effect.Individuals consider
the norm of cooperation that is proposed
externally [the announced optimal level] when
extracting (p. 238). C (See text)

Table 3 continued…
Citation
[19] Heyman
and Ariely
(2004)

Subjects
(number)
240 US
students
(150+90)

Games or
activities
A
computer
task and a
puzzle task

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Different forms of
compensation (cash, candy or a
cash-denominated amount of
candy)
• Different levels of monetary
compensation (none, low,
medium)

[20] Cardenas,
Stranlund
and Willis
(2000)

Colombian
forest area
dwellers
(112)

Common
Pool
Resource
Game

• External enforcement device
with a weak inspection and a
fine
• Communication

[21] Schotter,
et al.
(1996)

U.S.
students
(247)

Ultimatum
Game;
Dictator
Game

[22] Hoffman,
et al.
(1994)

U.S.
students
(270)

Ultimatum
Game;
Dictator
Game

• Survival treatment (twostage): subjects with higher
payoffs “survive” to proceed to
stage 2.
• Non survival treatment (one
stage): the proposer is randomly
assigned
• Contextual framing: a
simultaneous move-normal or a
sequential extensive form game
• Roles are assigned by contest
(the right to be the Proposer is
'earned' or randomly assigned).
• Different frame: “Exchange”
game (between a “seller” and a
“buyer”) or no frame
• Anonymity: Double blind or
not

Results relevant to separability
Effort in both the cash and the candy
conditions increases when the compensation
level increases from low to medium. Effort
in the no-compensation treatment is higher
than the low- compensation condition for
both the cash and the cash in terms of candy
conditions and is not different from lowcompensation in the candy condition.
Performance from no-compensation to lowcompensation conditions decreases only
with monetary exchange mechanisms.
Fines induce more self-interested behavior
and common pool over-exploitation. Socially
optimal deviations from the selfish Nash
equilibrium behavior (and the implied
foregone payoffs by subjects) are least under
the fines.
Competitive threats to survival induce lower
offers, and in the UG fewer rejections of
low offers.

Offers are lower and fewer low offers are
rejected in an exchange context or when the
proposer earns the right to his role.
Proposers accurately gauge willingness of
responders to accept lower offers. Dictators
send lower amounts in double blind.
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The level and form of compensation affect
performance. “Monetary compensation may act as
a strong signal invoking norms of money markets
instead of social-market relations” (p. 6)
Monetary incentives influence the ways in which
tasks are framed and the motivation to engage in
them. The type of market in which the exchange
takes place influences the relationship between
reward and motivation. I
Weakly (exogenously) enforced fines diminish
socially motivated behavior. Fine appear to have
induced a shift from moral to self interested frame.
See Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999)
The context affects behavior: 'earning' right to be
the first mover or threat to survival induces
proposers to behave in a more self-regarding
manner. “…the competition inherent in markets
and the need to survive offers justifications for
actions that, in isolation, would be unjustifiable”.
(p.38) S

Institutional cues affect behavior: with property
rights (i.e. legitimate 'earning' right to be
proposer), a market framing or total anonymity
proposers and responders are more self-regarding.
S

Table 3 continued…
Citation
[23] Herrmann
and Orzen
(2008)

Subjects
(number)
British
students
(93)

Games or
activities
Prisoner’s
dilemma
Game and
Tullock
RentSeeking
Game

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Two different sequences
(strategic vs. individual):
First week: a Prisoner’s
dilemma
Second week: the two-player
Tullock Rent-Seeking Game
(with another subject) or a
individual choice task (with the
same incentives) plus a
Prisoner’s dilemma

Results relevant to separability
Players cooperate more when they
previously played an individual choice
task than when the previous game is
competitive –strategic, one (i.e. the Rentseeking Game)

27

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Cooperation and reciprocity rates decrease after
subjects are exposed to rent-seeking competition.
Subjects may perceive the interaction in the rentseeking contest as a negative one. “…an individual’s
attitude towards others undergoes changes between
different types of situations because they evoke
different contextual cues”. (p. 3) “the experience of
over-competitiveness in the contest game creates a
disposition of rivalry in subjects that some cannot
immediately “turn off” when the experiment ends” (p.
26)

Table 4. Incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination (S)
Subjects
(number)
German
students
(130)

Games or
activities
GiftExchange
Game

[25] Fehr
and
Schmidt
(2007)

German
Students
(70)

GiftExchange
Game

[26] Falk
and
Kosfeld
(2006)

Swiss
students
(804)

GiftExchange
Game

[27] Gneezy
(2003)*

U.S
students
(400)

ProposerResponder
Game

[28] Rustrom
(2002)

U.S.
students
(110)

Creative
task
('tower of
Hanoi')

Citation
[24] Fehr, et
al.
(2007)

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Three internal forms of enforcement: The
principal can choose to rely on
- a trust (pure fixed wage) contract, or a
price deduction (i.e., fine) contract
- a trust, a fine or an unenforceable bonus
contract
• Different frames: employer- employee or
buyer-seller
• Two internal forms of enforcement: The
principal can choose to rely on
- an announced unenforceable bonus
contract
- A combination of the bonus contract with
a fine.
• Different levels of suggested minimum
level of performance (low, medium, and
high)
• The levels are external (medium) or
imposed by principals
• A gift exchange game: the principal
decides whether to control the agent and
also determines agent’s wage
• The responder has three forms of
enforcement (a punishment at a given cost,
a reward at a given cost and nothing)
• Different levels of the responder’s
enforcement (weak, strong)

• Two forms of external enforcement (a
penalty or a reward)
• Different levels of the external
enforcement (none, weak, strong)

Results relevant to separability
Bonus contracts yield higher joint surplus
than the fine contract; principals converge
towards the bonus contract. Trust contracts
yield lower joint surplus than incentive
contracts and bonus contracts. Agents spend
more effort under a bonus contract than
under a fine contract. The results are the
same independently of the framing.
Most principals do not use the fine. The
joint surplus under the pure bonus contract
is 20 percent greater than under the
combined contract. Wages are 54 percent
higher in the pure bonus contract. Profits
are not significantly different in the two
contracts.
Most agents perform minimally as a
response to the principals’ controlling
decision. Majority of the principals
anticipate this and do not control, earning
higher profits as a result.

Non-monotonic effects of explicit
incentives (fines and rewards) on
performance (a W -shaped function).
Offers are highest with large incentives
(fine and reward), and lowest with small
incentives. The no incentive case, when
proposers simply dictate allocation, is
intermediate.
Penalties degrade performance; large
rewards induce better performance than
small (but no better than the no-incentive
treatment)
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Effectiveness of incentive contracts may
depend on the agent's other regarding
preferences: With fair-minded players,
incomplete contracts that rely on fairness
as an enforcement device (i.e., bonus)
provide powerful incentives, superior to
explicit incentive contracts. I
“Explicit and implicit incentives are
substitutes rather than complements” (p.
3). Agents perceive that principals who
are less fair are more likely to choose a
combined contract and less likely to pay
the announced bonus. The effect of
effort on the bonus paid is twice as great
in the pure bonus case. I
Control and explicit incentives are
signals of distrust and low expectations,
diminish agents’ reciprocity and good
will towards the principal. Categorical
crowding out. I

Extrinsic incentives undermine intrinsic
motivation: a small fine or reward
changes the mode of behavior from
“moral” to “strategic”. See Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a, b) and Mulder, et al.
(2006) [29] [30] [39]. Categorical
crowding out. F
Explicit incentives have a detrimental
effect on performance, but only in the
case of penalties, not in the case of
rewards. Penalties 'distract' subjects.

Table 4 continued…
Citation
[29] Gneezy and
Rustichini
(2000b)

[30] Gneezy and
Rustichini
(2000b)

Subjects
(number)
Israeli students
(160 for the
main
experiment)
Israeli students
(180)

Games or
activities
50 IQ test
questions
(plus a
Principal
Agent
Game)
Collected
donations
from
households

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Different levels of monetary
rewards for correct IQ test
response (very low, low, high and
none)

Results relevant to separability
A discontinuity in the effect of incentives at
zero. Small rewards degrade performance;
large rewards enhance it.

Discontinuity at zero. Performance with
small rewards is lower than performance
with high rewards and both are lower than
performance with no rewards.

• Different levels of monetary
rewards for the voluntary work
(low, high and none)

29

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The presence of the incentive
substitutes extrinsic for intrinsic
motivation). Categorical crowding out.
See Gneezy (2003) [27] F
The presence of the incentive
substitutes extrinsic for intrinsic
motivation). Categorical crowding out.
See Gneezy (2003) [27] and Upton
(1974)

Table 5. Incentives alter the environment in which new preferences are learned (E)
Citation
[31] Burks,
Carpenter
and Goette
(2009)

Subjects
(number)
Swiss and
U.S bike
messengers
(139+113)

[32] Reeson and Australian
Tisdell
Students
(2008)
(98)

[33] Carpenter,
et al.
(2008)

U.S
students
(172)

[34] Gaechter,
Swiss
Kessler and students
Konigstein (500)
(2008) *

Games or
activities
Sequential
Prisoners’
dilemma
Game

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Messenger exposure to performance
based pay in their work place or not

Results relevant to separability
In a restricted sample unlikely to be affected by
selection bias, second movers' exposure to
performance pay is associated with between 12
and 15 percent greater likelihood of defection on
a cooperative first mover.

Public Goods • Three external forms of enforcement:
Game
- moral suasion in the form of a single
sentence to the effect that the payoff to all
would be higher if all contributed (all
periods);
- a minimum contribution unexpectedly
introduced during 4 periods and then
removed
- none
Public Goods • Costly punishment: subjects can punish
Game
non-cooperators at a cost to themselves
• Different team’s residual claim (marginal
per capita return on the public good)
• Different group size

While the regulation is in place (during the
middle stage) contributions are significantly
higher than in the initial stage in which only
suasion occurs. After the regulation is removed,
contributions are 20 percent lower than in the
initial stage. The suasion treatment dramatically
increases voluntary contributions compared to a
no suasion control.

GiftExchange
Game

Under incentive contracts agents choose a self
interested best reply (effort) and there is no
voluntary cooperation. If the contract is not
incentive compatible under the other contracts
there is voluntary cooperation. Experiencing welldesigned contracts reduces voluntary cooperation
even after incentives are withdrawn.

• Three external forms of enforcement: a
Trust (pure fixed wage contract), a price
deduction (i.e., fine) contract and a bonus
incentive contract
• Stranger and Partner
• Different sequences
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Shirkers are punished by peers and respond by
contributing more, even in the last round unless
the frequency of reciprocators is too low or the
group is too large. High contributors who are
punished subsequently contribute less.
(Unpublished results not reported in paper).

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The fact that the effects are from a
game having no obvious connection
with the job suggests that
preferences learned under the
incentive conditions of the work
place are adopted outside the
workplace.
Extrinsic rewards alter subjects
preferences (crowding out other
regarding preferences) or beliefs
(conveying a different idea of the
appropriate behavior in this game.)
Categorical and marginal crowding
out. F, C

Altruistically motivated mutual
monitoring, by enhancing shameinduced cooperation, supports high
levels of team performance.
Synergistic effects of social
preferences and peer-imposed
incentives. I
Incentives may have a lasting
negative effect on voluntary
cooperation. F

Table 5 continued…
Citation
[35] Meier (2007)

[36] Henrich, et al.
(2005)

[37] Irlenbusch and
Sliwka (2005)
*

[38] Bohnet, Frey
and Huck
(2001)

Subjects
(number)
Swiss students
(11379)

Games or
activities
Contributions
to two funds to
support
financially
needy other
students.

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• Matching donations: For a
single semester subjects'
contributions are not
matched or matched
• Matching donations at
high or low rates.
No matching in subsequent
periods

Matching increases contributions when
they are in force. Those who
experience matching are substantially
less likely to make a contribution to
either fund in subsequent periods;
average contributions show a small,
insignificant negative net effect of the
incentive.

Foragers,
herders, others
in 15 smallscale
societies
(1128)
German
students
(84)

Ultimatum
Game

• Differences between
societies in the level of
market integration and the
potential payoffs to
cooperation

Substantial cross cultural co-variation
between the degree of market
integration (engagement in market
exchange) and both average UG offers
and the propensity to reject low offers.

Gift-Exchange
Game

Incentives reduce cooperation (i.e.
effort level) and the effect persists after
the incentive is removed. Where
principals are constrained to offer fixed
wages the effort levels of agents are
considerably higher than when
employers can choose an incentive
contract.

Incentives (price rate) alter principals’ and
agents’ perception of the situation: "lead
agents to adopt an individual maximization
frame ... rather than a cooperative frame,”
“agents have a stronger concern for the
principal’s wellbeing in the pure fixed wage
setting.” (p. 23) F

U.S. students
(154)

Contract
Enforcement
Game (finitely
repeated)

• Two internal forms of
enforcement: The principal
can choose to rely on
- a trust (pure fixed wage)
contract
- compensation contract
(i.e., a variable piece rate)
• Two different sequences
for the contracts
• Different legal institutions
(low, medium or high
contract enforcement
probability)
• Low contract enforcement
in the last rounds for all
sessions.

The probability of enforcement and/or
the cost of breach in the early rounds
have a non-monotonic effect on
contract performance in the later
rounds: intermediate levels of contract
enforcement decrease trustworthiness,
low levels and high levels of legal
contract enforcement increase
trustworthiness.

“If there is enough time for the crowding
dynamics to unfold, environments with low
contract enforcement can produce outcomes
as efficient as high levels of enforcement.”
(p.141) “by affecting behavior, institutions
affect preferences.” (p.142) F

Results relevant to separability
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The negative matching effect is probably not
due to the information it conveys on the
neediness of the funds (larger effect for the
smaller matching rate) or to the subjects'
desire to compensate for higher matching
induced contributions in the treatment period
(subjects whose contribution was unaffected
by matching also exhibited a negative effect).
F
Mutually beneficial interactions in market
interactions with strangers may support the
evolution of cultures of fair-mindedness
towards strangers; “doux commerce”?
Hirschman (1977). C

Table 5 continued…
Subjects
(number)
Parents
[39] Gneezy and
from ten
Rustichini
day care
(2000a)
centers in
Haifa,
Israel
[40] Falkinger, et al. Swiss
students
(2000) and
(196)
personal
communication
from Gaechter
18 February
2008.
Citation

Games or
activities

Public
Goods
Game

Institutional environments
(treatments)
• An explicit enforcement (i.e.
fine) is imposed for lateness in
six of these centers.

Incentive compatible
(Falkinger (1996)) mechanism
and no mechanism;
• large and small group size;
• Interior and corner Nash
equilibria.
•

Results relevant to separability
Tardiness doubles in the six treatment
centers and persists even after the fine is
removed. No change in the four control
centers.
Subjects implement the self-interested level
of contribution under the mechanism, but
contribute substantially more than the self
interested level in its absence (until late in the
20 period experiments) (e.g. Figure 5). After
experiencing the mechanism subjects
contribute 26 percent less when it is
withdrawn than those who have not
experienced it.
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
The modest fine signal ‘how bad’ lateness
is and/or is perceived as a price of a
service and displaces an ethical frame by
a strategic one: “A fine is a price.” I, F, S
By rewarding contributions and
penalizing shirkers the mechanism may
have relieved subjects' sense of moral
responsibility and legitimated the pursuit
of self interest. The effects persisted after
the withdrawal of the mechanism. F, I

Table 6. Incentives and social preferences as complements (C)
Citation

Subjects
Games or
(number)
activities
Public
[41] Herrmann, 16 student
pools around Goods
et al.
Game
the world
(2008)
(1120)
(Partner)

[42] Rodriguez
-Sickert,
Guzmán
and
Cárdenas
(2008)

Rural
Colombians
from 5
communities
(128)

Common
Pool
Resource
Game

[43] Galbiati
and
Vertova
(2008a) *

Italian
students
(216)

Public
Goods
Game –
one shot
(and a
Lottery
Game)

Institutional environment
(treatments)
Monetary Costly Punishment

Results relevant to separability

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Punishment is socially beneficial only if
•
Cooperation is higher in the punishment condition.
complemented by strong social norms of
However, the average payoff with the punishment
cooperation with strangers so that peer
condition is lower than the average without
punishment in many countries. Weak norms of civic punishment induces shame rather than
cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a resentment. The quality of the formal law
enforcement institutions and informal sanctions
country are significant predictors of antisocial
are complements, “because antisocial
punishment (punish the high contributors), which
punishment is lower in these societies.” (p.
reduces the net benefits to the group.
1367.)
• Three different forms of
Under all treatments other than the no fine, groups
When fines are rejected, the implied
external enforcement (A fine
start at high levels of cooperation. Cooperation
affirmation of social norms may have
regime imposed, a fine
remains high only when a fine, be it high or low, is in temporarily increased cooperation; reciprocal
proposed to the players and
force. If the players reject the fine, cooperation
preferences (anger at low contributors) may
rejected or accepted by them,
slowly unravels. Presence of low fines prevented
account for the subsequent erosion of
none)
unraveling of cooperation.
cooperation. Small fines enhance unconditional
• Different levels of external
cooperation by relieving cooperators of the
enforcement (low, and high) for
need to retaliate against defectors. I, F
the imposed fine
Incentives not only influence material payoffs
Suggested contributions alone do not induce high
• Different levels for the
minimum level of contribution levels of cooperation. A high minimum contribution but also frame recommended high
contributions as obligations. Including both
with the presence of an incentive raises individual
rule (zero, low and high)
implicit and explicit incentives activate values
average contributions independently of the level of
• A symmetric incentive
and/or coordinate individuals’ beliefs, give
structure (a level of contribution the incentive (low or medium) and increases the
salience to minimum contribution rules and
expectation about others’ contributions.
less (more) than the minimum
make them act as focal points for beliefs about
contribution could be subject to
others’ contributions. Obligations directly
a penalty (reward)) with low
affect average beliefs about others’ and
and medium size
cooperation. Categorical crowding in. F
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Table 6. Continued…
Subjects
(number)
[44] Gaechter, British
Nosenzo Students
and Sefton (84)
(2008) *

Games or
activities
GiftExchange
Game with
3-members
firms (one
employer
and two
employees)

Institutional environment
(treatments)
• Employees move sequentially
(Employee 1 has pay comparison
information (i.e. information about what
coworker earns) and Employee 2
additionally has an effort comparison
information (information about how coworker performs)
• Employers can offer high wages to
both employees, a high wage to
Employee 1 only, a high wage to
Employee 2 only, and low wages to both

[45] Lopez, et Colombian
al. (2008a) Fishermen
*
(240)

Public
Goods
Game

[46] Serra
(2008) *

Bribery
game
(public
officialcitizen)

• Monetary Costly Punishment. After
making the decision individual
contributions are publicly posted
anonymously and subjects can sanction
other’s contribution decisions privately.
• plus an external enforcement
(announcement of the socially optimal
level of contribution) with monitoring
• Different levels of external
enforcement (low, and high) for the
imposed fine
• Two different sequences: monitoring
and players’ sanctioning and vice versa
• Three different forms of external
enforcement (no monitoring; top-down
auditing, and an accountability system
which gives citizens the opportunity to
report corrupt officials)

Citation

British
students
(180)

Results relevant to separability
A homogeneous wage does not affect
effort when an employee is matched
with a co-worker that efforts less.
Reciprocity is more pronounced when
the co-worker is hard-working, as effort
is strongly and positively related to own
wage and when the employer pays
unequal wages to the employees.
Exposure to pay comparison information
in isolation from effort comparison
information does not appear to affect
reciprocity toward employers
Sanctions combined with external
enforcement let to nearly perfect
contributions and higher earnings
Higher individual contributions with
monetary sanctions fail to yield higher
earnings. See Masclet, et al. (2003)

Under the combined accountability
system, fewer officials engage in
corruption. The presence of only topdown auditing did not affect the amount
of officers who demanded a bribe but
induced corrupt officials to demand a
higher bribe than no monitoring.
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Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Unequal wages conditional on worker type may
induce high levels of reciprocity based effort;
unconditional employer generosity fails to
recognize the ‘deserving’ worker, and is not
reciprocated. Incentives and social preferences as
complements. Workers respond to employers’
recognition of their deservingness, not to
employer generosity.

Individuals do use the ability to sanction others in
their group and increases cooperation.
External regulation complements community
enforcement efforts.
“When community members have better
information about the behavior of their neighbors
than the external regulator they can fine tune
external enforcement efforts” (p. 15) Crowding
in. See Velez, Stranlund and Murphy (2009)

“Non-monetary costs activated by the bottom-up
component of the combined system had a
significant impact on the public official’s decision
to engage in bribery.” (p.17)

Table 6. Continued…
Subjects Games or
(number) activities
Labor
Swiss
[47] Falk,
Market
Fehr and Students
Game (one
Zehnder (240)
employer,
(2006)
three
workers)
[48] Masclet, US (96)
Public
et al.
and French Goods
(2003)
(44)
Game
students
(140)
Citation

[49] Gaechter Austrian
and Falk students
(116)
(2002)
[50]]Barr
(2001) *

GiftExchange
Game

Zimbabwea Public
n villagers Goods
Game
(602)

Institutional environment
(treatments)
• With and without a minimum wage.
• Two different sequences

Results relevant to separability
The introduction of a legal minimum wage
affects workers’ fairness preferences leading
to a rise in their reservation wages (which
persists even after the minimum wage has
been removed).

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
“Minimum wages [may] affect [subjects'] fairness
perceptions” (p.1376) creating moral
“entitlements”. Obligations activate and or
enhance social preferences. See Galbiati and
Vertova (2008a, b) [12] [43] F, E

Both sanctions show higher and similar
levels of contributions. Individuals tend to
make higher contributions relative to the
preceding period the higher punishment they
have received and the lower their
contribution was relative to the group
average. When the device is removed, having
previous monetary sanctions show higher
contributions than having non monetary
sanctions but the cost of enforcing monetary
sanctions causes overall earnings to be
similar under both sanction treatments.

Cooperation can be enhanced by non monetary
sanctions for reasons that are not strategic and
may require repeated interaction. It appears that
non monetary punishment, while not affecting the
best response of a pay off maximizer, nonetheless
raised contributions by enhancing the salience of
social motives like shame or external peer
pressure. Guilt may lead individuals who
contribute less than the average to increase their
contribution levels more than others. Crowding
in. See Lopez, et al. (2008b)

With repetition, effort levels are higher than
one shot interaction and some selfish subjects
act strategically as reciprocators and choose
the minimal effort level in the last period
• Two external forms of non monetary After the introduction of the public
announcement and public criticism subjects
punishment
contribute more.
- Public announcement: each player
announces her level of
contribution to everyone present in the
session
- Subjects could make public verbal
statements about each other’s
decisions: lighthearted
criticism or the withholding of praise
during informal gatherings

Repeated interaction strengthens reciprocity
norms and induces ‘imitated’ reciprocity. “The
social norm of reciprocity and the repeated game
incentives are complementary.” (p.18)
The fact that non-material punishment raises
contributions suggests that it induces shame or
other social emotions (the best response for a
material payoff maximizer were unaffected). See
Gaechter and Fehr (1999) and Mulder, et al.
(2006). Subjects may contribute in accordance
with their obligations defined with reference to
the level of contribution that each member would
like all community members to choose. F

• Two external forms of Punishment
with different levels of disapproval
(from 0 to 10 points received by a
subject from any other agent):
Monetary punishment (subjects can
reduce the monetary payoff of others
after observing their decisions) and non
monetary punishment (subjects express
disapproval of others' decisions with no
effect on others’ earnings)
• Stranger and Partner
• Three stages: In the first and third
stages without the punishment. In the
second stage, with punishment
• Stranger and Partner
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Table 6. Continued…
Subjects
(number)
Hungarian
[51] Falk,
Gaechter students
(126, 38)
and
Kovacs
(1999)
Citation

Games or
Institutional environment
activities
(treatments)
Gift• Stranger and Partner
Exchange • Two social approval treatments (face to
Game
face, social pressure)

Comment
(quotes are from the cited paper)
Partner treatment increased effort levels; Repeated interactions provide powerful
incentives while enhancing both intrinsic
social pressure has little effect. Wage
effort relationship (based on reciprocity) reciprocity motives and concerns for equitable
shares (social pressure adds little).
is steeper under partner than under
stranger.
Results relevant to separability
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